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We conduct a thorough statistical analysis of the empirical foundations for the existence of a Taylor rule. 
Inflation, the output gap and the federal funds rate appear to be non-stationary variables that are not 
cointegrated. Although this lack of cointegration could be caused by missing variables or structural 
breaks, we are unable to ￿salvage￿ the rule using several plausible candidate variables and break dates. We 
also investigate the possibility that the Taylor rule should be modeled as a nonlinear relationship. We find 
that a simple threshold model makes significant progress towards rectifying some of the shortcomings of 
the standard model. 
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Determining the reaction of monetary authorities to changes in fundamental economic variables 
has long been a goal of fed watchers and monetary economists. In particular, economists have 
focused on how the Federal Reserve Bank responds to economic fundamentals when 
determining the short term interest rates. The majority of this research is based on the monetary 
policy rule introduced by Taylor (1993). This is an algebraic, linear rule and is defined as it = r* + 
π t + α (π t - π *) + βỹt , where i is the nominal Federal funds rate, r* is the target real federal funds 
rate, π t is the inflation rate over the last four quarters, π * is the target inflation rate and ỹ is the 
percentage deviation of real GDP from the target real GDP. Taylor sets both the target real 
federal funds rate and the target inflation rate equal to 2 and puts equal weights, 0.5, on 
deviation from the inflation target and deviation from the real GDP target. While this original 
specification seemed robust using the data from 1987 to 1993, it became clear as more data 
accumulated over time that modification of the original rule was required. 
 
I n  o rd e r t o  i m p ro v e  t h e  p er f o rm a n c e o f  t h e r u l e,  i t  b ec a m e  a l m o s t  s t a n d a rd  t o  a d d  l a g g e d  
values of the federal funds rate as explanatory variables.2 The economic interpretation of this 
addition is that the Fed smoothes interest rates over time, moving gradually towards the target. 
Lately, however, this practice has been questioned. In particular, Rudebusch (2002) argued that 
if the fed does indeed smooth interest rates, the addition of the lagged federal funds rate to the 
monetary rule should increase our ability to forecast the future federal funds rate. He finds that 
this is not the case and hence concludes that the statistical significance of the lagged federal 
funds rate in the regressions is actually due to highly serially correlated errors.3  
 
                                                 
2 See for example Clarida et al. (2000), Woodford (1999), Goodhart (1999), Levin et al. (1999), Amato and Laubach 
(1999), and Sack (1998). 
3 English, Nelson and Sack (2003) estimate a model which expressly allows for both a lagged federal funds rate and 
serially correlated errors. They conclude that both are present and significant.  3
Another direction that has been explored by a number of researchers is potential nonlinearity of 
the Taylor rule. There are several reasons why a nonlinear specification might seem reasonable. 
The standard derivation of the Taylor rule posits a Federal Reserve loss function that depends 
on the squared deviation of inflation from the target and the square of the output gap. The 
solution from this quadratic specification is a linear Taylor rule similar to the original Taylor 
(1993) rule. There are, however, many reasons to suppose that this linear framework is 
problematic. Among them is the possibility that the effect of the federal funds rate on the output 
gap or on the inflation rate may not be linear; for example it may be more difficult to eliminate a 
negative output gap than a positive gap, or, as a number of theoretical and empirical papers 
suggest, inflation may increase more readily than it decreases. Another cause for nonlinearity in 
the Taylor rule might be that the Fed￿s loss function is asymmetric, suggesting that the Fed has 
higher tolerance for inflation that is slightly below the target than inflation that is slightly above 
the target.4 Yet another potential cause for nonlinearities is uncovered in a number of papers 
which find that several key macroeconomic variables follow asymmetric paths over the course 
of the business cycle. These nonlinearities can manifest themselves in a nonlinear Taylor rule. 
Finally, nonlinearity of the Taylor rule could be caused by the fact that the parameters are not 
stable over time. 5 
 
The goal of this paper is to carry out a thorough statistical analysis of the data in an attempt to 
determine whether a stable linear or nonlinear relationship does in fact exist. We describe the 
data and perform some preliminary tests for stationarity in Section 2. In Section 3, we show that 
there is no meaningful cointegrating relationship between inflation, output gap and federal 
funds rates.6 Without cointegration, any estimated relationship between the variables is 
                                                 
4 See Surico (2004 ) for an exploration of this avenue. 
 
5 One type of nonlinearity which is almost always incorporated in models of monetary policy is permanent regime 
shifts. These are believed to be caused by policy changes due to changes in the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank 
or changes of power in Congress and/or the White House which may have driven the Federal Reserve bank to change 
its policies. Papers by Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2004), Kim, Osborne and Sensier (2004), Nobay and Peel 
(2003), and Ruge-Murcia (2003) consider other types of nonlinearity. 
 
6 A similar result has been obtained by Ősterholm (2005).  4
spurious, calling into question whether a Taylor rule exists. To obtain additional insight into the 
failure of the cointegration tests, we carry out recursive estimates of the (invalid) equation to get 
a sense of how the parameter estimates change over time. Since the lack of cointegration could 
be caused by missing variables, in Section 4, we investigate several plausible candidate 
variables without success.  Next, we examine the possibility of structural breaks in the data. All 
empirical work in this area has estimated the Taylor rule for limited periods of time under the 
assumption that there have been several permanent regime shifts, mostly in connection with 
shifts in the leadership of the Federal Reserve Bank. Nevertheless, when we use break dates 
coinciding with changes in the chairmanship of the Fed, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration. We consider the possibility that the data appears not to be cointegrated 
because the shifts are placed at incorrect dates. Instead of using intuitive break dates obtained 
by looking at events, we also use a data-driven selection method due to Bai and Perron (2003). 
This does not change the result that there is no stable cointegration relationship.  
 
In the final portion of Section 4, we investigate the possibility that the Taylor rule should be 
modeled as a nonlinear relationship. The tests indicate that there are indeed nonlinearities in 
the model, but do not seem to indicate that one specific parameter is the cause. We therefore 
proceed to investigate the possibility that a threshold model is a reasonable approach to 
modeling the determination of the federal funds rate; that is, if a given variable exceeds a 
threshold, the Fed reacts in one manner, and otherwise it has a different response.  We find that 
when the inflation is low (less than about 2.3%) the Fed does not interfere at all, but when 
inflation is high, a relationship similar to the standard Taylor rule holds! This model makes 
significant progress towards explaining the misspecifications of the standard model, such as 
seemingly unreasonable high smoothing of the interest rates, unstable parameter estimates and 
lack of cointegration. While it is not, to our knowledge, possible to formally test whether this 
model is stable over the long run, informal checks seem to indicate that this might indeed be the 
case. Conclusions and directions for further research are contained in Section 5.  
  5
2. The Data 
The data we used was obtained from FRED II (Federal Reserve Economic Data).7 We have 
quarterly observations from 1954:3 to 2003:4. We chose to follow the variable definitions used in 
Rudebusch (2002). Specifically, inflation is constructed using the chain-weighted GDP deflator 
(pt) and the four-quarter inflation rate, π t, is computed as the simple average of the individual 
inflation rates.  Hence,   
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We constructed the output gap (yt) as the percentage difference between real GDP ( qt) and 
potential output (
*
t q ) so that: 
  yt = 100*(qt/
*
t q −  1) . 
Measurements of output, the potential output and the price index can change over time due to 
factors such as definitional changes and revisions in the data.  In order to see how our variables 
correspond to those used in Rudebusch (2002), we used OLS to estimate the following Taylor 
rule over the sample period 1987:4 −  1999:4, the same as the one used by Rudebusch (2002) 
(with robust t-statistics in parentheses)    
 
  it = 0.397 + 0.481π t + 0.263yt + 0.751it-1    (1) 
        (2.26)   (3.92)       (4.65)      (13.84) 
 
The slope coefficients are sufficiently close to Rudebusch￿s (0.413, 0.251 and 0.75) that our 
results should be comparable.  
  
The first issue we consider is the whether or not the three variables, it, π t, and yt are stationary.  
Toward this end, we perform several unit-root tests on each variable over several different 
sample periods.  The full span of our data is from 1954:3 to 2003:4.  Within that period, several 
authors have indicated key break dates.  The so-called ￿Great Inflation￿ began in the late 1960￿s 
                                                 
7 FRED II is a database of over 3000 U.S. economic time series available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
website http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.  6
(we use 1968:4 as a break date). The early 1970s saw the end of the Bretton Woods system; as 
such it seems reasonable to use 1973:4 as a potential break date.  The change in the Federal 
Reserve￿s operating procedures in began in 1979:4, and the Volker disinflation ended by 1983:1. 
For each variable and for each sample period with more than 25 observations, we estimated an 
equation of the form: 
 







∆ ∑ + ε t 
 
We did not include a deterministic time trend since there is little reason to believe that any of 
the variables are trend stationary. The lag length n was selected by the general-to-specific 
methodology.  Beginning with n = 7, we tested the statistical significance of β n using the 5% 
significance level.  If β n was not statistically different from zero, we reduced n by 1 and repeated 
the procedure until β n was statistically significant.  Given this lag length, we then obtained the t-
statistic (denoted by τ  ) for the null hypothesis ρ  = 0.  The number of lags and the estimated 
values of ρ  and τ   are given in Table 1 for various sample periods. 
 
From the results presented in Table 1, it is clear that the federal funds rate and the weighted 
inflation rate show little evidence of mean reversion over any sample period. In particular, this 
is true for both of the samples beginning with Alan Greenspan￿s tenure as Fed chairman in 
1987:4. For the output gap, however, the results of the Dickey-Fuller tests are very dependent 
on the sample period under consideration.  For example, the output gap shows some evidence 
of mean reversion over the very long sample periods.  Although we cannot reject the unit-root 
hypothesis for the samples beginning in 1979:4, there appears to be strong evidence of mean 
reversion for the samples beginning with 1983:1.  Moreover, if we begin with 1981:1 (a date not 
shown in the table), or in 1987:4 (as Rudebusch did), the unit-root hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Notice that ρ   is actually positive for the 1987:4 −  1994:4 period.  
  7
We have now completed thorough testing for unit roots, using the standard textbook methods. 
Because much of what follows relies on the fact that the series are indeed I(1), we will proceed a 
little further using the latest techniques for unit root testing. In a recent paper M￿ller and Elliott 
(2003) highlighted the dependence of the power of unit root tests on the deviation of the initial 
observation of the series from its underlying deterministic component. They show that the 
Dickey-Fuller test we employed above has excellent power properties for large values of this 
initial deviation, while the test proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) (henceforth 
ERS) is optimal when the initial deviation is 0. A recent paper by Harvey and Leybourne (2003) 
(henceforth HL) proposes a unit root test which combines the strengths of the two statistics. 
They use a data-dependent weighted average of the Dickey-Fuller test ( DF τ ) and the ERS 
statistic, with the weight determined by an estimate of the deviation of the initial observation 
from the underlying deterministics. 
 















where S(•) is the sum of squared residuals from the AR(1) GLS estimation of y with  ρ ρ =  and 
1 = ρ  respectively.  ()
2
1
2 2 ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ ∑ = − =
n
i i β σ ω ε , where 
2 ˆε σ  and the i β ˆ  are obtained from the same 
regression we used to calculate the Dickey-Fuller statistic. 
 
With both the Dickey-Fuller and the ERS statistics in hand, the HL statistic can be computed as 
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In Table 1, we report λ ˆ  as well as HL τ . The asymptotic critical values for HL τ  are -1.91 (10%), -
2.21 (5%), and -2.80 (1%). In general, the λ ˆ  indicate that the HL test places 50% or less weight 
on the Dickey-Fuller statistic. It is clear from the table that the new test provides even stronger  8
evidence against the hypothesis of mean reversion, and we will therefore maintain the 
hypothesis that the variables are I(1) throughout the rest of this paper. 
 
An additional issue which deserves mention is that in the presence of structural breaks and 
neglected nonlinearities, unit root tests will have reduced power. We will examine breaks and 
nonlinearities in some of the discussion below. For now, we continue to work with the data 
under the assumption that the three series are best characterized as I(1) variables. In this case, 
equation (1) does not describe a valid long run relationship between the variables unless they 
are cointegrated. We explore this issue in the next section.     
 
 
3. Testing for a Taylor rule 
Given the results of the Dickey-Fuller tests, it, π t, and yt appear to be nonstationary. As such, the 
relationship represented by (1) is spurious unless the variables are cointegrated. Thus, to 
establish the existence of a Taylor rule, it is necessary to verify that the variables are 
cointegrated. Moreover, even if it, yt and πt are cointegrated, inference cannot be conducted 
using traditional t-tests unless the regressors are weakly exogenous and the errors are serially 
uncorrelated.   
 
Notice that (1) is not conducive to testing for cointegration.  One problem is that it is I(1) and ∆ it 
is I(0). Hence, in (1), there is necessarily a cointegration relationship between the left-hand-side 
variable it and the right-hand-side variable it-1.  Thus, there must be two cointegrating 
relationships among the variables in (1) if it is to be cointegrated with yt and π t.  By estimating 
(1) using OLS, one cannot hope to uncover the two separate cointegrating relationships.  
Instead, it seems more appropriate to use the Johansen (1998, 1991) methodology to check for 
cointegrating relationships of the form: it = a0 + απ t + βỹt .  Lag lengths for the Johansen test were 
selected using the general-to-specific strategy in such a way as to minimize the multivariate  9
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).8 The results for the various sample periods are reported in 
Table 2.  Columns 3 −  5 of the table report the  sample values of λ max(r) for the null hypothesis of 
exactly r cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis of r + 1 cointegrating vectors. 
Columns 6 −  8 show the estimated parameters of the (potential) cointegrating vector.  
 
Notice that the Taylor rule fails for all periods with a starting date prior to 1979:4. In those 
instances where it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, at least one of the 
estimated coefficients of the cointegrating vector has the incorrect sign.  For example, in the 
1955:3 −  1968:4 period, the sample value of λ max(0) = 11.31 is less than the 5% critical value of 
22.00.  In the 1955:3 −  2003:4 period, the null of no cointegration can be rejected at the 5% level, 
but the signs of α  and β  are both incorrect.    
 
The samples beginning with 1979:4  are problematic in that the Fed temporarily switched from 
targeting the federal funds rate to controlling non-borrowed reserves during 1979:3￿1982:3. As 
such, we follow the example of most applied papers on the Taylor rule and eliminate this 
period from serious consideration. For the 1983:4 −  2003:4 period, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration can be rejected in favor of the alternative of exactly one cointegrating vector at the 
5% significance level. There is no evidence of a second cointegrating vector and the estimated 
values of α  and β   are all of the correct sign.  Nevertheless, substantial care must be exercised 
before concluding that the Taylor rule holds in the Volcker-Greenspan period since: There is no 
cointegration for the 1983:4 −  1999:4 period and these cointegration results break down when 
the starting date is changed to coincide with Alan Greenspan￿s tenure as Federal Reserve 
Chairman.  As shown in last two rows of Table 2, the sample values for λ max(0) are both well 
below the 10% critical value of 19.77.   
 
                                                 
8 We also used the lag lengths selected by the multivariate Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). The results were 
sufficiently similar that we do not report them here. In the few cases where there were significant autocorrelations in 
the residuals, additional lags were added to eliminate the problem.   10
In our view, it strains credibility to argue that the results support the existence of a Taylor rule 
during the entire Volcker-Greenspan period. Nevertheless, someone might be tempted claim 
that the use of the two subsamples results in enough loss of power such that Johansen test is not 
able to detect a significant cointegrating relationship. To challenge this claim, notice that the 
estimated cointegrating relationship for the 1983:1 −  2003:4 period is: 
 
  it = − 1.22 + 3.07π t + 1.44yt + et   (2) 
                  
  Consider the estimates of the error-correcting model (with t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
  ∆ it = -0.035[ it-1  −  1.22 −  3.07π t-1 −  1.44yt-1 ]  + stationary dynamics 
          (-1.60) 
 
∆ π t = − 0.016[ it-1  −  1.22 −  3.07π t-1 −  1.44yt-1 ]  + stationary dynamics 
           (− 1.36)  
 
∆ yt = 0.106[ it-1  −  1.22 −  3.07π t-1 −  1.44yt-1 ]  + stationary dynamics 
         (4.29) 
 
Even though the Johansen test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, this 
model does not tally with our requirements for a Taylor rule. The first issue is that since the 
coefficient -0.035 on the error-correction component of the federal funds rate is insignificant, the 
federal funds rate is weakly exogenous. Hence, the point estimates suggest that the federal 
funds rate does not respond to a deviation from the cointegrating relationship. This is clearly 
inconsistent with the spirit of a Taylor rule.  Furthermore, the t-statistic for the speed-of-
adjustment coefficient for the four-quarter inflation rate provides mild evidence that inflation 
responds to a discrepancy from the equilibrium relationship by moving in the ￿wrong￿ 
direction. For example, if inflation is 1 percentage point higher than that suggested by the long-
run relationship, it is estimated that inflation increases by another 0.05 (0.016*3.07 ≅  0.049) of a 
percentage point.  Finally, the output gap does respond significantly and in the correct direction 
to restore long-run equilibrium.  For example, if the output gap is one unit higher than that  11
suggested by the long-run relationship, is estimated that the gap decreases by 0.15 units 
(1.06*1.44 ≅  0.15). Unfortunately, given the prolonged nature of the business expansion in the 
Clinton period, this speed of adjustment seems overly strong. Overall, (2) is more likely to be an 
output determination equation than a Taylor rule.   
 
As shown on the right-hand side of Table 2, a similar pattern emerges when we examine the 
forward-looking version of the Taylor rule given by it = a0 + απ t+1 + βỹt+1. Of course, the large 
sample properties of the cointegration tests are identical since cointegration between variables yt 
and xt, implies cointegration between yt and xt+1. Again, cointegration fails for most of the early 
periods. For our purposes, the important point is that there does not appear to be a significant  
cointegrating relationship for any period beginning in 1983:1 or 1987:4.   
 
To better understand the failure of the Taylor rule, we confine our attention to the Greenspan 
periods of 1987:4 −  1999:4 and 1987:4 −  2003:4. Toward this end, we will examine equation (1) 
for parameter stability.  First, however, we re-estimated equation (1) to check for and remove 
any serial correlation in the residuals.  Specifically, if ρ i denotes the ith-order correlation 
coefficient constructed from the first eight residual autocorrelations are:  
 
ρ 1  ρ 2  ρ 3  ρ 4  ρ 5  ρ 6  ρ 7  ρ 8 
0.58 0.39 0.36 0.22 0.12 0.09 − 0.04 − 0.14
  
When we included an additional lag of the federal funds rate in the estimation equation we 
obtained: 
 
it = 0.409 + 0.318π t + 0.184yt + 1.29it-1 −  0.505it-2  (3) 
        (2.77)   (3.96)       (4.05)      (13.75)    (− 6.19) 
   12
Diagnostic checking indicated no remaining serial correlation in the residuals.  Estimation over 
the entire sample period also suggested the second lag was appropriate, and we will therefore 
proceed with the specification in (3) below. 
 
To examine (3) for parameter stability, we performed recursive estimates of the Taylor rule 
equation for the entire 1989:4 ￿ 2003:4 period.  Specifically, for each time period in the interval 
1989:4 to 2003:4, we estimated an equation of the form in (3) using observations 1984:4 through 
T.  Since 2 observations are lost as a result of the lagged dependent variable, we obtained 55 
regression equations.  Beginning with 1994:1, the time paths of the estimated intercepts, 
inflation coefficients, output gap coefficients and the sum of the autoregressive coefficients are 
displayed in Panels 1 through 4, respectively.  If the parameters are constant over time, we 
would not expect any particular pattern in the coefficients.  However, Panel 1 of the figure 
clearly reveals that the intercept term seems to drift downward beginning in 1995. The 
implication is that the Federal Reserve￿s inflation target was lowered over this part of the 
sample period. In addition the point estimate of the coefficient on inflation in the early part of 
the sample is significantly above that in the latter part. This indicates that the Federal Reserve 
responded less severely to deviations of inflation from the target in the late 1990￿s than in the 
earlier part of the sample period.  Finally, there is a significant and steady decline in the 
coefficient on the output gap as well as a sharp increase in the sum of the coefficients on the 
lagged interest rates beginning in 1995. Thus, the phenomenon of interest rate smoothing was 
far more marked in the latter part of the sample than the earlier part.   
 
The point is that the Federal Reserve seemed more responsive to current economic phenomena 
in the early 1990s than the late 1990s.  The late 1990s are characterized by high degrees of 
interest rate smoothing and low degrees of responsiveness to deviations of inflation from target 
and to the output gap.  Hence, even though the output gap declined substantially, the Federal 
Reserve￿s response was limited. 
  13
To summarize, since the variables are best modeled as I(1), a cointegration relationship 
must exist for there to be a stable relationship among the three variables. It is clear however, 
that even in the instances where the tests do not reject such a cointegration relationship, the 
results do not support the existence of a stable Taylor rule. Adherents of the standard Taylor 
rule might be unimpressed with the finding that the federal funds rate is not cointegrated with 
the output gap and inflation. After all, cointegration tests have very little power over relatively 
short sample periods. Our view is that the instability of the parameter estimates over various 
sample periods and the unduly high persistence of the federal funds rate calls the entire Taylor 
rule into question. After all, it was a monetary economist, Milton Friedman, who pioneered the 
idea that a rule must be a stable function of a limited number of explanatory variables. Since (3) 
does not provide a stable relationship between the relevant variables, we are left with two 
possibilities: The first is that (3) is misspecified in some manner and therefore does not provide 
the desired long run relationship. The other, more disturbing possibility (to economists 
anyway), is that there is no fixed rule governing how the fed determines interest rates. Before 
resigning ourselves to the second possibility, we will thoroughly explore the first.  In the next 
section we will explore possible misspecifications which might be the cause of the parameter 
instability as well as the lack of cointegration.  
 
4. The Search For the Missing Money Rule 
 
In this section, we will explore a number of possible causes for misspecification of (3) with the 
hope of finding a specification which leads to a stable cointegration relationship and parameter 
estimates which do not vary systematically over time. First, we focus on the possibility of a 
missing variable from the standard Taylor rule specification. Next we consider the possibility 
that the break dates determined by looking at significant economic events are wrong. Instead of 
relying on intuition we apply several data-driven methods to choose the break dates. Finally, 
we will proceed to explore the possibility that it is the assumption of linearity which leads to  14
misspecification. In Section 4.3 we will discuss potential causes for nonlinearity and examine 
several nonlinear extensions of equations (1) and (3). 
 
4.1 An examination of the variables 
One possible cause of misspecification is that there is a variable missing from the 
standard Taylor rule specification. Suppose that the Federal Reserve is concerned about the 
magnitude of the output gap, the inflation rate, and a third macroeconomic variable. The 
omission of this key variable from (2) could explain the findings of the previous section. 
Changes in the magnitude of this variable would manifest themselves as structural breaks in the 
standard specification, leading to parameter instability. If changes in this third variable were 
persistent, the federal funds rate would appear to be persistent. Finally, if there were a single 
cointegrating relationship between these three variables and the federal funds rate, the rate 
would not be cointegrated with the output gap and inflation.  
 
We obtained several likely candidates for the missing variable. In testimony to congress, talks, 
speeches and interviews, Chairman Alan Greenspan indicated that the Federal Reserve was 
concerned about the so-called ￿irrational exuberance￿ of the stock market. Since ￿irrational 
exuberance￿ is not a well-defined concept, we tried several different measures. One natural 
measure is a run-up of stock prices relative to earnings. As such, we obtained Shiller￿s (2000) 
quarterly values of the price-earnings ratio over the 1881:1−  2003:4 period.9 The variable is 
constructed as the real value of the S & P Composite Index (SP) divided by the total real value 
of the earnings of the companies included in the index. As discussed in more detail below, we 
also used several measures of actual movements in SP.  
 
We also obtained quarterly values of the Index of Consumer Sentiment from University of 
Michigan￿s survey of households (www.sca.isr.umich.edu/main.php). Consumer confidence 
(cons_con) is generally deemed to be a leading indicator of consumer expenditures on durables 
                                                 
9 The data as well as a detailed description are available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm  15
and of overall economic activity. The variable is one of ten included in the Conference Board￿s 
Index of Leading Economic Indicators. The other forward-looking variable we obtained was the 
University of Michigan￿s measure of expected changes in interest rates. The survey records the 
response to the following question: ￿No one can say for sure, but what do you think will 
happen to interest rates for borrowing money during the next 12 months−− will they go up, stay 
the same, or go down?￿ We used the proportion of people indicating that rates will go up.  
 
Prior to introducing the price-earnings ratio into equation (3) we performed standard unit-root 
tests, which indicated that {SPt} behaves as an I(1) variable over the sample periods under 
consideration. As such, we used the Johansen (1988, 1991) methodology to check for a 
cointegrating relationship between it, π t, yt and SPt.  The results for the 1987:4 −  1999:4 and 
1987:4 −  2003:4 sample periods are reported in Table 4. At the 5% level, the critical value of the 
Johansen λmax statistic is 28.14. The sample values of T ln (1 −  λ 1) are 20.86 and 22.69 for the 
1987:4 −  1999:4 and 1987:4 −  2003:4 periods, respectively. Hence, at conventional significance 
levels, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  
 
We also included SPt into the standard linear equation in the form of (3). Consider the estimated 
equation for the sample period 1984:1 −  2003:4 
 
it = 0.140 + 0.24π t + 0.16yt −  0.03 SPt + 1.29it-1 −  0.40it-2  (4) 
        (3.05)   (3.98)     (1.50)    (− 3.13)    (11.57)   (− 4.05) 
 
For this sample period, the coefficients for π t and yt are reasonably close to those in equation (3). 
The point estimates are such that the federal funds rate is predicted to decline as SPt increases. 
In fact, the point estimates of the SPt coefficients reported in Table 5 are quite consistent over 
the various sample periods. The possible explanation is that there is reverse causality such that 
decreases in interest rates lead to increases in SPt. Nevertheless, the single equation approach 
does nothing to support that claim that SPt belongs in the Taylor rule equation. These results  16
support the findings using the Johansen cointegration tests (that make no particular 
assumptions concerning weak exogeneity).  
  
Next we consider the possibility that {cons_cont} is a variable missing from equation (3). Since 
{cons_cont} also behaves like an I(1) variable, we used the Johansen methodology to check for a 
cointegrating relationship between it, π t, yt and cons_cont. As reported in the lower portion of 
Table 4, at the 5% significance level, we were able to reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration for the 1987:4 −  1999:4 period. However, the estimated cointegrating vector (also 
reported in the table) had a negative coefficient on yt. Since a negative response to the output 
gap is inconsistent with a standard model of the Taylor rule, we do not believe that the reported 
equation is meaningful. Moreover, we were not able to reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration for the extended 1987:4 −  2003:4 sample period. 
 
We experimented with the notion that only recent movements in the index, rather than its 
overall level, might be deemed important by the Federal Reserve. Towards this end, we 
constructed other measures of ￿irrational exuberance,￿ such as a four-quarter moving average of 
the logarithmic change in the S & P Composite Index. Since a moving average of stock market 
returns is stationary, we did not search for a cointegrating relationship for it, π t, yt and our 
constructed measures. However, as suggested by Johansen and Juselius (1992), a stationary 
variable can be used as a conditioning variable in a test for cointegration. The notion is that a 
stationary covariate might enhance the power of the cointegration test since it controls for some 
of the deviations from the long-run equilibrium relationship. Dickey-Fuller tests indicated that 
the University of Michigan￿s expected change in interest rate (∆ ie) variable is I(0) over all sample 
periods considered. We did not find any reasonable cointegrating relationship among it, π t, yt, 
with any stationary measure of ￿irrational exuberance￿ or with ∆ ie. 
 
This concludes our exploration of the choice of variables. Since none of the other potential 
choices we explored improved the model, we will proceed with the original model as specified  17
in equation (3). In the next section, we will explore the possibility that the subsamples used to 
estimate the model are improperly chosen. 
 
4.2 Subsample choice  
One possible reason for the poor performance of the Taylor rule is that the subsamples 
used in the estimations are improperly chosen.  As such, it might be the case that an equation in 
the form of (1) is properly specified but that the break dates are incorrect. Estimating the model 
with a break where there is none will reduce the power of the cointegration test, increasing the 
l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  w e  a r e  u n a b l e  t o  r e j e c t  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  o f  n o  c o i n t e g r a t i o n .  T e s t i n g  f o r  
cointegration when a shift is undetected, will make the residuals appear to be integrated, and 
therefore make less likely that cointegration will be detected. Instead of prespecifying the 
breakpoints of each subsample, it is possible to use a completely data-driven method to select 
the break points.  Bai and Perron (2003) show how to estimate the number of breaks and the 
break dates when the number and the location of breaks is unknown. As such, we applied the 
Bai-Perron procedure to the specification used in (3) using the full sample period.  Specifically, 
we estimated the equation  
 
it = α0j + α1jyt + α2jπt + α3jit-1 + α4jit-2 + εt   (4) 
 
where: j = 1, ￿ , m + 1 and m is the number of breaks.  Equation (4) allows for m breaks that 
manifest themselves by shifts in any or all of the coefficients in the equation.  The first break 
occurs at t1 so that the duration of the first regime is from t = 1 until t =  1 t  and the duration of the 
second regime is from  1 t  + 1 to  2 t .  Because the m-th break occurs at  , m tt =  the last regime 
begins at  m t  + 1 and lasts until the end of the data set.  In applied work, the maximum number 
of break s n eeds to b e spec ifi ed.  We al low ed f or a max imu m of nu mber of 5 b reaks.  Th e 
procedure also required that we specify the minimum regime size (i.e., the minimum number of 
observations between breaks).  We set the minimum duration of any regime to be 8 quarters.  
  18
The sequential estimation method and the global estimation method both indicated five 
structural breaks.  The sequential method selected the following break dates along with a 95% 










1968:4 1967:3  1969:1  5 
1980:1 1979:2  1980:2  1 
1984:1 1983:4  1985:1  2 
1998:1 1997:3  1998:4  3 
2000:2 1999:4  2000:3  4 
 
Notice that there are six distinct periods; the first runs from 1954:1 to 1968:3 and the last runs 
from 2002:2 through 2003:4.  The sequential procedure selects the break dates in order of their 
importance.  The most important break came in 1980:1; a 95% confidence interval for this break 
spans the period 1979:2 through 1980:2.  The coefficients for the six ￿Taylor￿ rules for each 
subsample are reported in Table 3.  There seems to be at least two separate regimes. The first is 
the 1980:1 ￿ 1983:3 period, which stands out from the others in that the Federal Reserve 
responded strongly to both the output gap and the four-quarter inflation rate. Relative to the 
other periods, the coefficients on yt and πt are large and have low prob-values.  Moreover, the 
Bai-Perron procedure indicates that this break date is the ￿most important￿ of the break dates. 
The second regime seems to occur in two periods, 1968:4 ￿ 1979:4 and the 1984:1 ￿ 1997:4. In 
these periods, the Federal Reserve followed a practice of interest rate smoothing (as measured 
by the coefficients on it-1 and it-2) and responded to the four-quarter inflation rate.  
 
Finally, there are two periods 1998:1 ￿ 2000:1 and 2000:2 ￿ 2003:4, which are both very short 
(two years) and statistically different from the other periods.  The suggestion that the Federal 
Reserve changed its policy rule twice within the last four years brings into question the very 
nature of a rule.  After all, if a rule is changed frequently, it ceases to become a rule.  On the one 
hand, it might be argued that the Bai-Perron procedure simply selected spurious breakpoints.  
However, during the first of these periods, the Federal Reserve did raise the federal funds rate a  19
number of times in order to stem the so-called ￿irrational exuberance￿ of the stock market.  In 
the second period, the Federal Reserve substantially decreased the federal funds rate in order to 
stimulate economic activity. For these last two periods, we are skeptical on the actual 
coefficients (and their t-statistics) since each of these periods contain only eight observations 
which are used to estimate five coefficients.  
 
If the BIC criterion is used to select the break dates instead of the sequential method, similar 
break dates are chosen.  The important difference is that 1984:3 ￿ 2003:4 is estimated to be a 
single￿contiguous period.  The estimated model for this sample period is    
 
it = 0.191 + 0.262π t + 0.144yt + 1.24it-1 −  0.384it-2  (5) 
        (1.32)   (2.22)       (2.59)      (7.05)    (− 2.83) 
 
While the breakpoints reported in period 2 do not exactly match those we have used, they are 
fairly similar. Thus it doesn￿t seem that the misspecification was caused by improperly chosen 
breakpoints. While permanent breaks constitute the simplest deviation from linearity, it is by no 
means the only plausible one. In the next section we will explore whether other types of 
nonlinearity might explain the unsatisfactory results obtained earlier. 
 
4.3 Nonlinear Specifications 
  Allowing for the possibility of a nonlinear Taylor rule might help to explain some of the 
problems which appear in the model. There are several reasons why a nonlinear specification 
might seem reasonable. A number of papers find that several key macroeconomic variables 
follow asymmetric paths over the course of the business cycle. The point is that nonlinearities in 
key macroeconomic variables can manifest themselves in a nonlinear Taylor rule. The standard 
derivation of the Taylor rule posits a Federal Reserve loss function that depends on the squared 
deviation of inflation from the target and the square of the output gap: 
 
 
2* 2 (1 )( ) tt t Lw y w ππ =+ − −   20
 
where L is a measure of the Federal Reserve￿s overall loss, π * is the target inflation rate, and w is 
the weight placed on the output gap in the loss function.  
 
Since yt and π t are linear functions of the federal funds rate, the control problem is to select the 
magnitude of the rate that minimizes the loss. A more complicated control problem would 
allow for some rigidity in the system so that the rate exhibits some persistence. Nevertheless, 
the solution from this linear-quadratic specification is a linear Taylor rule so that it is a linear 
function of yt and π t.  
 
There are many reasons to suppose that the linear-quadratic framework is problematic. One 
possible source of nonlinearity is that the effect of the federal funds rate on the output gap or on 
the inflation rate may not be linear. It is often claimed that monetary policy is like ￿pushing on a 
string.￿  To the extent that it is more difficult to eliminate a negative output gap than a positive 
gap, the Federal Reserve needs to decrease the federal funds rate more sharply than it increases 
the rate. Similarly, there are a number of theoretical and empirical papers suggesting that 
inflation increases more readily than it decreases. If it is more difficult to check inflation than to 
allow inflation, the Federal Reserve needs to produce a relatively small reduction in the federal 
funds rate when inflation is below the target. Another potential problem with the basic linear 
model is that a quadratic loss function implies that the Federal Reserve is equally concerned 
about high inflation and low inflation relative to the target rate. However, the recent concern 
about deflation implies that losses from a small negative inflation are larger than the losses from 
a small positive inflation. Even if we abstract from deflation, there is substantial reason to 
believe that the loss function is not symmetric around π *. The so-called ￿inflation hawks￿ at the 
Fed would be more tolerant of an inflation rate that is 1% below target than inflation that is 1% 
above target. Similarly, a quadratic loss function assumes that the Fed is unconcerned about the 
sign of the output gap; 1-unit shortfall of output from potential produces the same loss as a 1-
unit increase in output over potential. However, to many observers, negative output gaps in the  21
two Bush presidencies were more substantial problems than the positive output gap in the 
Clinton years. These types of nonlinearities would imply that some sort of threshold model is 
reasonable. Yet another source of nonlinearity would be if the standard assumption that the two 
losses in the loss function are separable were relaxed such that the loss resulting from inflation 
depended on the magnitude of the output gap. The non-separability of the loss function could 
help explain why the combination of low output and high inflation is more intolerable than 
high output and low inflation. Finally it is possible that changes in economic and political 
circumstances can induce changes in the weight that the Federal Reserve places on the output 
gap. Moreover, the target inflation rate need not be constant over time. These types of 
nonlinearities would imply either permanent breaks, which we examined in Section 4.2, or that 
we do not have a Taylor rule, in the case of a constantly changing inflation target.   
 
To uncover any nonlinearities, we began by performing a number of diagnostic tests to help 
uncover any nonlinearities using various sample periods. The Regression Error Specification 
Test (RESET) posits the null hypothesis of linearity against a general alternative hypothesis of 
nonlinearity. Specifically, for the sample periods shown in Table 5, we used the residuals from 
the estimated Taylor rule in the second stage regression: 
4
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where et is the residual from the estimated Taylor rule and ˆ
t i is the fitted value. This regression 
should have little explanatory power if the model is truly linear. It is possible to reject the null 
hypothesis of linearity if the sample value of the F-statistic for the null hypothesis α 2 = α 3 = α 4 = 
0 exceeds the critical value from a standard F-table. 
 
It is interesting that the sample F-values all have prob-values that are quite small when 1983:1 is 
used as the starting date and exceed 0.05 when 1987:4 is used as the starting date. The 
suggestion is that there is something unique about the 1984:1 −  1987:3 period compared to the 
remaining portion of the sample. These results are reinforced by the results of a CUSUM test.  22
As shown in Panel 1 of Figure 5, if a starting date of 1983:1 is used, the cusums begin to depart 
from the lower 5% confidence bound beginning almost immediately. Instead, if 1987:4 is used as 
the initial starting date, the cusums stay bounded within a ±  5% band for almost the entire 
sample period. Next we test for coefficient stability. We would not expect the coefficients to be 
stabl e ov er tim e giv en th e resu lt s w e hav e so f ar, bu t w e are hoping t o obtain som e mor e 
concrete information. We use the coefficient stability test introduced in Hansen (1991). 
 
  We were surprised to find that Hansen￿s test for coefficient stability found little evidence 
of structural misspecification. The test indicates that the four equations using 1983:1 as a 
starting date have a non-constant value of β  so that it is clearly possible to reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the rule itself are constant. For example, as shown in Table 7, 
the sample value of Hansen￿s test statistic for the intercept is 0.346. The critical values for the 
individual coefficients and variance are 0.470 and 0.748 at the 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. The critical values for the joint test that all parameters, including the variance, are 
constant are 1.68 and 2.12 at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. There seems to be 
more evidence of parameter instability using the starting date of 1987:4. However, it is not 
possible to pick out the particular parameters leading to the rejection of the joint test.  
 
  Table 7: Hansen￿s Coefficient Stability Test 
Start End  intercept  ππππ t  yt sum  σσσσ 2  Joint 
1983:1  1997:4   0.314  0.353   0.788**  0.187  0.432  2.795** 
  1999:4   0.276   0.325   0.743*   0.171   0.537*   2.679** 
  2001:1   0.272   0.331   0.743*   0.180   0.530*   2.607** 
  2003:4   0.275   0.293   0.683*   0.129   0.399   2.579** 
1987:4  1997:4   0.092   0.068   0.086   0.085   0.262   1.525 
  1999:4   0.121   0.088   0.336   0.095   0.153   1.985* 
  2001:1   0.261   0.199   0.450   0.241   0.122   2.384** 
 2003:4    0.613*   0.438   0.055   0.354   0.138   1.918* 
 
Since we have not been able to narrow the problem to one specific parameter, and there 
are no obvious permanent breaks which seem to solve the problems we have encountered, it 
seems natural to explore the possibility of a threshold model. That is, if a given variable exceeds  23
a threshold, the fed reacts in one manner, otherwise it has a different response. Judging from 
the press releases of the fed, the most natural candidate for a threshold variable would seem to 
be inflation, but we investigate all three variables as possible threshold variables. To this end, 
we performed Hansen￿s (1997) test for a threshold process. Specifically, Hansen develops a test 
to determine whether all values of β i in the following equation are equal to zero:10  
 
it = α 0 + α 1π t + α 2yt + α 3it-1 + α 4∆ it-2 + It(β 0 + β 1π t + β 2yt + β 3it-1 +β 4∆ it-2 ) + ε t 
 
where: It = 1 if xt-d > τ  and It = 0 otherwise. We let d take on the values of 1 and 2. The consistent 
estimate of d is obtained from the regression with the best fit. The consistent estimate of τ  is 
obtained using a grid search over all potential thresholds. We followed the customary 
procedure by eliminating the lowest and highest 15% of the ordered values of xt-d in order to 
ensure an adequate number of observations on each side of the threshold. Notice that It is an 
indicator function that denotes whether the magnitude of xt-d exceeds a particular threshold 
value. The essence of the model is that there are two linear segments for the Taylor rule. If the 
value of xt-d exceeds the threshold, the federal funds rate is given by it = α 0 + α 1π t + α 2yt + α 3it-1 + 
α 4∆ it-2 + ε t. Alternatively, if xt-d ≤  τ  the federal funds rate is given by it = (α 0 + β 0) + (α 1 + β 1)π t + (α 2 
+ β 2)yt + (α 3 + β 3)it-1 + (α 4 + β 4)∆ it-2 + ε t. If all values of β i equal zero, the model is linear. Since the 
threshold is estimated along with the other parameters of the model, the test for the null 
hypothesis of linearity (i.e., all values of β i = 0) cannot be performed using a standard F-test. 
Hansen (1997) shows how to appropriately perform an F-test test using a bootstrapping 
procedure. We used 4000 bootstrap replications for each of the sample periods listed in Table 8 
and as expected, we found π t-1 was a better candidate for the threshold variable than π t-2, yt-1 or 
yt-2. When we used π t-1 as the threshold variable, we obtained: 
 
 
                                                 
10 Notice that it = α 0 + α 1π t + α 2yt + a1it-1 + a2it-2 is easily transformed into it = α 0 + α 1π t + α 2yt + α 3it-1 + α 4∆ it-1 where α 3 = a1 




Table 8: Hansen￿s Test for a Threshold Process 
Start End  ττττ   F-stat prob-value 
1983:1 1997:4  3.66  4.52  0.022 
 1999:4  3.65  4.67  0.022 
 2001:1  3.66  4.53  0.024 
 2003:4  3.54  2.89  0.207 
1987:4 1997:4  2.38  5.63  0.011 
 1999:4  2.38  6.07  0.004 
 2001:1  2.19  6.35  0.002 
 2003:4  2.48  5.25  0.010 
 
 
N o t i c e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  s t r o n g  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h r e s h o l d  b e h a v i o r  u s i n g  a n y  s a m p l e  p e r i o d  e x c e p t  
1983:1 - 2003:4. The specification is such that it = α 0 + α 1π t + α 2yt + α 3it-1 + α 4∆ it-2 when inflation is 
above the threshold, and equal to it = (α 0 + β 0) + (α 1 + β 1)π t + (α 2 + β 2)yt + (α 3 + β 3)it-1 + (α 4 + β 4)∆ it-2 
when  π t-1 is below the threshold value shown in the column labeled τ    in Table 8. The 
estimations for the sample periods beginning with 1987:4 are shown in Table 9. Notice that all 
tell the same remarkable story.  
 
Table 9: The Estimated Threshold Models 
end  αααα 0  ββββ 0  αααα 1  ββββ 1  αααα 2  ββββ 2  αααα 3  ββββ 3 
1997:4 0.866 -0.658 1.158 -0.842 0.495 -0.332 0.406  0.458 
  (1.88) (-0.52) (7.85) (-1.51) (7.47) (-2.87) (7.045) (5.50) 
1999:4 0.866 -0.759 1.158 -0.893 0.495 -0.408 0.406  0.485 
  (1.88) (-1.02) (7.85) (-3.15) (7.47) (-5.15) (7.045) (6.46) 
2001:1 0.019 0.450  1.164 -0.935 0.401 -0.328 0.499  0.335 
  (0.06) (0.85)  (5.98) (-3.76) (5.97) (-4.64) (6.78)  (3.74) 
2003:4 0.476 -0.063 1.017 -1.006 0.388 -0.330 0.507  0.395 
  (0.71) (-0.09) (5.41) (-4.22) (4.49) (-3.59) (5.13)  (3.76) 
 
First note that the coefficients are quite stable across the four sample periods. For example, the 
four estimates of α 1 are 1.158, 1.158, 1.164 and 1.107. Moreover, the estimated threshold values  25
of 2.38, 2.38, 2.19 and 2.48 are quite reasonable as Federal Reserve target inflation rates. When 
inflation crosses a threshold of something more than 2% per year, there is a switch in the 
behavior of the Federal Reserve. When inflation is above the threshold, the estimated Taylor 
rule seems quite standard. For example, when π t-1 exceeded 2.48 in the 1987:4 −  2003:4 period, 
the estimated Taylor rule is 
 
it = 0.476 + 1.017π t + 0.388yt + 0.507it-1 + α 4∆ it-1  
 
Notice that the weight placed on inflation is far greater than the weight placed on the output 
gap. It is also important to note that interest-rate persistence (as measured by the coefficient on 
it-1 = 0.507) is small compared to the standard estimates such as that in (2).  
 
When inflation is below the threshold, the federal funds rate acts as a near random-walk 
process. The point estimates in Table 9 are such that α 1 ≅  β 1, α 2 ≅  β 2 and α 3 + β 3 ≅  1. Also notice 
that the intercepts α 0 and β 0 are either insignificant and/or sum to a value near zero. Hence, 
when π t-1 ≤  τ , it is possible to approximate the estimated Taylor rules by the unit-root process: 
 
  it  ≅  it-1 + α 4∆ it-1 + ε t 
 
These estimates stand in stark contrast to usual linear estimates of the Taylor rule. When 
inflation is below the threshold, the Federal Reserve has little incentive to alter interest rates. 
The federal funds rate is kept relatively constant so that the rate has a substantial amount of 
persistence. The critical point is that there is a high-inflation and a low-inflation regime. In the 
low-inflation regime, the federal funds rate tends to be maintained at the prevailing level. 
However, when inflation exceeds the threshold, the Federal Reserve responds to inflation (and 
to a limited extent the output gap) by increasing the federal funds rate. The linear estimates of 
the Taylor rule find excessive interest rate persistence since they combine these high-inflation 
and low-inflation periods into a single regime. Hence, in the linear estimates, the near-unit root  26
regime is ￿averaged￿ with a regime with moderate interest rate persistence.  In addition this 
model explains why reaction to the output gap decreased over time when we estimated 
equation (3). In the latter part of the sample most of the observations fall in the low inflation 
regime where there is no reaction to the output gap. Similarly, the fact that the federal reserve 
bank let the federal funds rate ￿float￿ in this period would account for the appearance that the 
response to inflation decreased over time. 
 
The threshold model seemingly provides a plausible explanation of the results obtained in the 
literature so far. Nevertheless, we seem to have come full circle since the threshold model acts 
as a model with a structural break. To explain, the Panel a in Figure 6 shows the time path of π t 
and Panel b shows the estimated thresholds obtained from using a recursive estimation 
procedure. Specifically, for each time period in the interval T ≥  1997:4 to 2003:4, we estimated a 
threshold model with inflation as the threshold variable using observations 1987:4 through T.  
The first point in Panel b shows the estimated threshold for the sample period ending in 1997:4. 
The second point in Panel b shows the estimated threshold for the sample period ending in 
1998:1, and so on. A comparison of Panels a and b shows that the thresholds actually split the 
Greenspan period into two distinct regimes since inflation is almost always above the threshold 
until 1991:1 and is almost always below the threshold after 1991:2. For all practical purposes, the 
threshold model is the equivalent of a break at 1991:1.  
Panel c shows the coefficients for inflation and the output gap for the regime in which 
inflation is above the threshold (i.e., α 1 and β 1). When we examine Panel b and compare the 
coefficients in Panel c to their counterparts in Figure 4, it is clear that the parameters of the 
threshold process are very stable. The significance levels of Hansen￿s test for a threshold process 
are shown in Panel d. Notice that it is usually possible to reject the null of no threshold process 
at the 1% significance level.  
  When we use the Johansen procedure to check for cointegration over the 1991:1 ￿ 2003:4 
period we are not able to reject the null of no cointegration at conventional significance levels. 
This finding of no cointegration supports the notion that the federal funds rate is not adjusted to  27
the inflation rate or output gap in the low-inflation regime.  Moreover, if we estimate a standard 
Taylor rule for this period we obtain:  
 
it = 0.392 + 0.019π t + 0.064yt + 1.53it-1 ￿ 0.625∆ it-1  
      (2.09)   (0.148)     (1.50)     (13.48)    (− 5.84) 
 
As such, the inflation rate and the income gap are insignificant so that the federal funds rate acts 
as a univariate process with a characteristic root near unity.  
  The point is that it is very hard to maintain the existence of a Taylor rule during the 
Greenspan period. We tried estimating the Taylor rule as smooth transition LSTAR and ESTAR 
processes. However, the estimations were very similar to that of the threshold model. This 
should not be too surprising since, as shown in Figure 6, the there are really only two regimes 
and the transition occurs rather abruptly.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 In his original paper, Taylor (1993) made it clear that his rule was not intended to be a precise 
formula. In the Abstract, he states ￿An objective of the paper is to preserve the concept of such a 
policy rule in a policy environment where it is practically impossible to follow mechanically any 
particular algebraic formula that describes the policy rule.￿ Similarly, in a recent theoretical 
paper, Svensson (2003) raised serious doubts about the Taylor rule, because it is ￿incomplete 
and too vague to be operational￿ since ￿there are no rules for when deviations from the 
instrument rule are appropriate.￿ Our findings generally support this view. The nonstationary 
variables comprising the rule are not cointegrated within any reasonable subsample of the 
1954:3 −  2003:4 period. In the few cases where cointegration seems to hold, the signs of the 
coefficients are incorrect and/or the federal funds rate appears to be weakly exogenous. For the 
Greenspan period, the performance of the rule is not improved by adding additional variables 
such as a measure of irrational exuberance or a measure of consumer confidence.  Nonlinear 
models seem to indicate that the federal reserve was passive for the entire period beginning in 
1991.   28
  Given what we know about Alan Greenspan and the conduct of monetary policy, the 
only conclusion we can draw is that Taylor (1993) and Svensson (2003) were right. There is no 
doubt that the Federal Reserve pays attention to inflation and the output gap when deciding the 
course of monetary policy. The question is whether a simple mechanistic rule adequately 
describes the behavior of the federal funds rate. Our findings support the notion that there is no 
simple rule that is consistent with the data. 
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 Table 1: Unit Root Tests 
 
      Federal Funds Rate        Output Gap                                          Weighted Inflation    
                             
Start End  Lags  ρ     Lags  ρ     Lags  ρ      
          
 
      
 
        
1954:03  1968:04  2 -0.061  -1.303  0.22 9.633  1 -0.104  -2.068  0.38 3.894  6 -0.076  -1.406  0.48 5.717 
  1973:04  1 -0.073  -1.949  0.19 7.917  1 -0.112  -2.402  0.38 1.981  4 0.011  0.365  0.32 15.685 
  1979:04  3 -0.039  -1.283  0.18 8.489  1 -0.112  -2.807  0.41 0.723  4 -0.011  -0.639  0.24 19.423 
  1983:01  5 -0.078  -2.544  0.18 2.372  1 -0.075  -2.097  0.43 2.489  4 -0.021  -1.363  0.22 12.432 
  1987:04  7 -0.05  -1.777  0.18 3.953  1 -0.089  -2.923*  0.43 2.489  4 -0.02  -1.462  0.22 12.432 
  1999:04  7 -0.051  -2.192  0.16 3.027  1 -0.079  -3.074*  0.44 0.316  4 -0.017  -1.527  0.23 10.591 
  2003:04  7 -0.044  -1.965  0.17 3.032  2 -0.096  -3.925*  0.44 -0.586  4 -0.017  -1.59  0.26 7.913 
1968:04 1979:04  3 -0.157  -2.008  0.21 3.309  0 -0.13  -1.983  0.53 0.583  4 -0.083  -1.892  0.16  9.577 
  1983:01  5 -0.166  -2.764  0.19 0.829  0 -0.054  -1.055  0.54 2.886  4 -0.081  -2.279  0.15  6.797 
  1987:04  5 -0.147  -2.837  0.18 1.361  1 -0.105  -2.515  0.56 -0.233  4 -0.038  -1.605  0.21  11.089 
  1999:04  5 -0.108  -3.179*  0.18 1.038  2 -0.09  -2.915*  0.55 -0.747  4 -0.018  -1.34  0.23  9.107 
  2003:04  7 -0.057  -1.775  0.24 3.303  2 -0.097  -3.494**  0.53 -1.097  4 -0.017  -1.392  0.31  10.58 
1973:04 1983:01  5 -0.164  -2.021  0.30 1.677  0 -0.077  -1.102  0.60 2.524  1 -0.131  -2.997*  0.21  6.824 
  1987:04  5 -0.145  -2.225  0.32 1.728  1 -0.119  -2.32 0.61 -0.019  1 -0.04  -1.927  0.33  13.492 
  1999:04  5 -0.095  -2.67  0.33 1.111  1 -0.066  -2.051  0.57 0.015  4 -0.016  -1.304  0.36  12.894 
  2003:04  5 -0.073  -2.39  0.43 1.591  2 -0.089  -3.111*  0.51 -0.358  4 -0.016  -1.443  0.46  10.589 
1979:04 1987:04  5 -0.172  -1.527  0.44 1.806  1 -0.104  -1.579  0.46 4.179  6 -0.054  -1.95  0.51  11.667 
  1999:04  5 -0.076  -2.015  0.49 1.170  1 -0.043  -1.334  0.39 4.484  6 -0.037  -2.930*  0.57  6.423 
  2003:04  7 -0.037  -1.103  0.60 2.365  1 -0.058  -2.07 0.32 3.221  1 -0.032  -2.597  0.71  0.128 
1983:01 1999:04  1 -0.047  -1.683  0.34 3.225  2 -0.087  -3.507**  0.04 -7.802***  4 -0.059  -2.272  0.63  -0.536 
  2003:04  1 -0.026  -1.21  0.49 7.021  2 -0.108  -4.692***  0.03 -7.878***  1 -0.065  -2.461  0.69  -1.639 
1987:04 1999:04  1 -0.054  -1.943  0.12 8.672  0 0.009  0.206  0.24 4.254  4 -0.019  -0.61  0.08  9.983 
  2003:04  1 -0.039  -1.782  0.43 10.259  2 -0.093  -2.488  0.30 3.348  1 -0.04  -1.261  0.39  6.498 
              
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% levels, respectively            
DF τ DF τ DF τ λ ˆ
HL τ λ ˆ
HL τ HL τ λ ˆ
TableTable 2: Johansen Cointegration Tests 
 
   Taylor Rule    Forward Looking Taylor Rule 
Start End  λ max(0)  λ max(1)  λ max(2) a0  α   β   Lags   λ max(0)  λ max(1)  λ max(2) a0  α   β   Lags
1955:03  1968:04   11.31    9.87    2.44    3.31    0.22    0.39  2     21.36    7.72    1.63    2.65    0.38    0.12  2 
  1973:04   14.26    7.63    0.98    0.72    0.99   -0.60 2     22.39    9.97    1.16    1.98    0.75    0.02  2 
  1979:04   14.41    6.46    1.13    1.51    0.85   -0.10 4     10.20    6.94    1.11    1.51    0.92    0.04  4 
  1983:01   18.68    7.78    4.11    0.84    0.31   -2.09 3     16.75    8.62    5.39    1.05    0.42   -1.85  2 
  1987:04   21.80    9.45    4.49    1.99   -0.38  -3.67 3     21.97    7.97    4.99    1.81   -0.74  -4.50  3 
  1999:04   24.92   11.16    6.22    7.19   -2.54  -6.72 3     26.59    9.77    6.84    8.06   -4.18 -10.23 3 
  2003:04   28.46   12.31    5.24    6.72   -2.85  -7.65 3     18.18   12.38    6.32    0.00   -2.71 -12.64 4 
1968:04  1979:04   38.19   24.05    4.26    7.04   -1.33  -4.32 1     26.69   12.59    4.94    1.44    1.17    1.04  2 
  1983:01   24.48   11.79    2.06    9.95   -1.15  -1.99 3     27.76   10.85    2.35    7.90   -0.77  -1.98  3 
  1987:04   30.47   11.36    2.49   10.49   -1.29  -2.14 3     34.10   10.17    2.72    8.61   -0.86  -1.90  3 
  1999:04   27.71    9.52    4.06   10.33   -1.79  -3.07 3     30.75    9.53    4.29    8.69   -1.28  -2.65  3 
  2003:04   28.49    9.86    3.75   10.80   -2.73  -4.93 3     30.01    8.53    4.58    8.98   -1.91  -3.86  3 
1973:04  1983:01   17.76   13.92    3.08     2.95    0.02   -1.52 2     23.24   18.40    1.46   45.56   -5.12   0.69  3 
  1987:04   22.95   12.79    1.68   12.64   -1.61  -1.95 3     28.41   12.41    2.16   10.72   -1.17  -1.73  3 
  1999:04   21.48   11.16    3.14   12.34   -2.51  -3.56 3     25.08   12.37    3.89   10.66   -1.96  -3.17  3 
  2003:04   23.60   12.06    3.06   13.58   -4.27  -6.78 3     25.45   12.65    3.64   12.26   -3.44  -5.57  3 
1979:04  1987:04   53.76   29.92   10.59    2.54    1.76    0.22  4     37.38   20.42    6.80    0.51    2.58    0.55  4 
  1999:04   19.43   13.50    4.11   -1.40    3.00    1.18  3     26.60    8.72    5.54   -0.82    2.88    1.60  2 
  2003:04   26.02   17.42    3.29   -1.78    3.27    1.64  3     27.78   18.05    4.87   -2.25    3.58    1.98  3 
1983:01  1999:04   18.86    7.14    4.04   -0.89    2.81    1.13  2     18.69    5.51    3.50   -2.13    3.49    1.60  2 
  2003:04   24.94    8.22    5.50   -1.22    3.07    1.44  2     17.60   11.23    3.45   -0.42    2.67    1.13  3 
1987:04  1999:04    7.60    5.17    2.66   -2.40    3.38    1.17  2      9.22    6.82    5.60    0.41    2.38    1.36  2 
  2003:04   12.02    5.21    2.08   -1.36    3.11    1.34  2     15.18    5.68    5.09   -0.92    2.97    1.29  3 
 
 
The asymptotic critical values for the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of one cointegrating vector are 19.77, 
22.00 and 26.81 at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The critical values for one cointegrating vector against the 
alternative of two vectors are 13.75, 15.67, 17.63 and 20.02 at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
 Table 3:  Taylor Rules Using the Breakpoints Selected By the Bai-Perron 
Procedure 
 
Period  c it-1  it-2  yt  ππππ t 
























1980:1 −  1983:3  5.21  0.11  0.09  1.05  0.30 
 (7.30)  (1.20)  (0.97)  (10.07)  (3.75) 
1984:1 −  1997:4   0.45  1.18  − 0.33 0.25 0.19 
  (1.35) (5.19)  (− 1.75) (1.46) (2.01) 
1998:1 −  2000:1   0.64  0.51  -0.03  1.02  0.22 
  (0.17)  (0.54) (-0.03) (1.20) (0.37) 
2000:2 −   2003:4  1.71  0.81 0.10 -1.00  0.08 
  (1.11)  (1.48) (0.18) (-0.94)  (0.21) 
  
 
Table 4: Johansen Cointegration Tests with a Fourth Variable 
 
 
Series: it, π t, yt, SPt 
 
Sample: 1987:4 −  1999:4 
λ 1, λ 2, λ 3, λ 4 = (0.272,  0.253, 0.173, 0.025)    ; lags = 2, # observations = 49 
T ln(1 −  λ i) =   (20.68, 19.94, 12.33, 1.62) 
 
  Sample: 1987:4 −  2003:4 
 
λ 1, λ 2, λ 3, λ 4 = (0.295, 0.196, 0.126, 0.024)      ; lags = 3, # observations = 65 
T ln(1 −  λ i) =   (22.69, 14.16, 8.76, 1.56) 
 
Series: it, π t, yt, cons_con 
 
Sample: 1987:4 −  1999:4 
λ 1, λ 2, λ 3, λ 4 = (0.480,  0.283, 0.134, 0.050)    ; lags = 4, # observations = 49 
T ln(1 −  λ i) =   (32.08
*, 16.31, 7.04, 2.52) 
 
 i t = 41.11 + 2.87π t −  1.38yt + 0.427cons_cont     
       (7.08)    (13.14)   (4.47)     (7.49) 
 
Sample: 1987:4 −  2003:4 
 
λ 1, λ 2, λ 3, λ 4 = (0.348, 0.227, 0.171, 0.033)      ; lags = 4, # observations = 65 
T ln(1 −  λ i) =   (27.41, 16.47, 11.99, 2.11) 
 
The critical values for the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of one 
cointegrating vector are 28.14 and 33.24 at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  Table 5:  Taylor Rules Using Shiller’s ‘Irrational Exuberance’ Measure 
 
Start End  Date c  it−−−− 1  it−−−− 2  yt  ππππ t  SPt 
1984:1  1997:04  − 0.04 










(3.58)  (− 2.40) 
  1999:04  − 0.03 










(3.45) (− 2.19) 
  2001:01 1.41  1.16  − 0.35 0.22 0.23  − 0.03 
   (2.85)  (9.88)  (− 3.30) (2.05) (3.78)  (− 2.66) 
  2003:04 1.40  1.25  − 0.40 0.16 0.24  − 0.03 
   (3.05)  (11.57)  (− 4.05) (1.50) (3.98)  (− 3.13) 
1987:4  1997:04 1.46  1.14  − 0.37 0.26 0.29  − 0.02 
   (2.25)  (8.84)  (− 3.30) (1.60) (5.36)  (− 1.26) 
  1999:04 1.36  1.19  − 0.40 0.24 0.25  − 0.02 
   (2.70)  (9.37)  (− 3.60) (2.00) (4.65)  (− 1.96) 
  2001:01 1.54  1.16  − 0.39 0.25 0.27  − 0.03 
   (3.84)  (9.49)  (− 3.70) (2.50) (5.21)  (− 3.11) 
  2003:04 1.41  1.32  − 0.47 0.13 0.24  − 0.03 
   (3.40)  (11.63)  (− 4.61) (1.27) (4.44)  (− 3.11) 
 
 
Table 6: The RESET Test 
 
Start End  F   prob-value  T 
1983:1 1997:4 7.453978  0.000305  60 
 1999:4  8.398307  0.000095  68 
 2001:1  8.567142  0.000071  73 
 2003:4  7.206298  0.000255  84 
1987:4 1997:4 2.708514  0.060976  41 
 1999:4  1.383362  0.261403  49 
 2001:1  1.963124  0.132731  54 
 2003:4  0.563779  0.641120  65 
 
 Figure 1: The Federal Funds Rate











Figure 2: The Output Gap








Figure 3: The Four-Quarter Inflation Rate









FigureFigure 4: Recursive Estimation of the Taylor Rule
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1.1Figure 5: CUSUM Tests at Two Different Starting Dates 
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24Figure 6: Recursive Estimation of the Threshold Model



















Panel c: Coefficients for Inflation and the Output Gap










Panel b: Estimated Thresholds











Panel d: Significance Levels of Hansen's Threshold Test
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